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In the Southern District of Indiana, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to impose sanctions for an attorney’s failure to recognize non-existent AI-generated cases in his filings. Mid Cent. Operating Eng’rs Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, No. 2:24-cv-00326, 2025 WL 574234, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2025), ECF No. 99. At a show cause hearing to explain the citations to non-existent cases, the attorney explained that he had previously used AI to assist with legal matters, and he was unaware of AI’s potential for creating fictitious cases and citations. Id. at *1. The attorney claimed that the materials “appeared to be credible,” and he did not conduct any further inquiry into the validity of the citations. Id. The judge observed that the appearance of validity of the AI-generated material did not absolve the attorney from “his duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry” under Rule 11. Id. at *3. In reaching a conclusion, the judge recommended that the attorney be sanctioned in the amount of $15,000 ($5,000 for each of the three briefs filed with false citations) and referred the matter to the chief judge for consideration of further discipline pursuant to local rule. Id. at *5. In a subsequent ruling, the district judge referred the matter to the Indiana Attorney Disciplinary Commission for investigation and prosecution pursuant to local rules. In re Ramirez, No. 24-cv-00326, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2025). Upon reviewing the magistrate's report and recommendation, the court determined that a penalty of $6,000 would be adequate to prevent the recurrence of such conduct or similar conduct by others in comparable situations. Mid Cent. Operating Eng’rs, No. 2:24-cv-00326, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2025), ECF No. 121. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the attorney argued the sanctions were moot because he suffered "significant and irreversible harm" to his professional reputation. Id. at 1. The court rejected the attorney's argument because the admitted violations were within the court's jurisdiction to impose sanctions. Id. at 2. In reducing the amount of sanctions from $15,000 to $6,000, the court considered the attorney's remedial measures in educating himself on the responsible use of AI and the collateral consequences to the attorney's reputation. Id. In closing, the court opined that sanctions were warranted partly because the penalties previously imposed on other attorneys for similar misconduct have clearly failed to serve as a deterrent. Id. at 3. |
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In Nextpulse, LLC v. Life Fitness, LLC, No. 22-cv-03239, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2025), ECF No. 180, the magistrate judge sua sponte entered a show cause order against the plaintiff's lead counsel "to show why she should not be sanctioned for including false case citations in a brief filed in this matter." In a response brief to the defendant's motion to compel, counsel discussed a legal standard set forth by the Seventh Circuit and cited three cases as legal authority. Id. at 1-2. Six days later, the plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata, indicating in part that two of those case citations did not exist and should be ignored. Id. at 2. The plaintiff also noted a misattributed quotation in the brief. Id. At the subsequent motion hearing, lead counsel did not appear, but a new and unprepared local counsel appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. Id. at 3. The magistrate judge continued the hearing and required lead counsel to appear to address the errors in the plaintiff's response brief, including those noted in the accompanying errata. Id. In response, lead counsel claimed that the false case citations were inadvertently added to the brief while demonstrating the potential pitfalls of using AI for legal work to her daughter, leading to an unedited version being submitted to a paralegal. Id. at 4-5. Lead counsel only became aware of the error days later when local counsel could not find two of the cited cases, prompting her to prepare an erratum to notify both counsel and the Court. Id. at 5. The magistrate judge found defense counsel's explanation dubious (the "defense beggars belief"), particularly her claim that including fabricated cases in her brief was necessary for a “teachable moment.” Id. at 6. The proffered timeline of discovering the error and scrambling to address it was implausible, raising doubts about defense counsel's candor and honesty. Id. at 6-7. It appears that local counsel informed her of the issue soon after the brief was filed, contradicting her assertion of a five-day delay. Id. at 7. Consequently, the magistrate judge concluded that defense counsel’s use of GAI showed bad faith and warranted sanctions. Id. at 8. In light of the case's pending settlement, the magistrate limited the sanctions to a penalty of $5,000 and referral to the executive committee for further consideration. Id. at 9. Following a hearing on the plaintiff's objections to the aforementioned ruling, the district judge rejected the magistrate judge's report and recommendation for reasons stated on the record. Nextpulse, LLC, No. 22-cv-03239, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2025), ECF No. 195. The parties' stipulated dismissal likely played a part in the district judge's determination. Stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice at 1-2, Nextpulse, LLC, No. 22-cv-03239 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2025), ECF No. 193. |
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In Versant Funding LLC v. Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Enters. LLC, No. 17-cv-81140, 2025 WL 1440351, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2025), ECF No. 384, the court sua sponte considered the imposition of sanctions on the defendants for filing a response brief containing "a clear hallucination" of legal authority. In a reply brief, the plaintiff claimed that the citation could not be located, and the court verified this claim that no such case existed. Id. In response, the defendants indicated that counsel attempted to use AI to help with legal, "never having used it before." Id. at *2. Once counsel determined that the case cited did not exist, he called the plaintiff's counsel to apologize and to take appropriate remedial actions. Id. In considering sanctions, the court opined, "there is nothing inherently wrong with an attorney properly and competently utilizing AI or any of its subsets to practice law or litigate cases." Id. at *4. In the face of evolving technology, the court noted that "[j]ust as a competent attorney would very carefully check the veracity and accuracy of all case citations in any pleading, motion, response, reply, or other paper prepared by a law clerk, intern, or other attorney before it is filed, the same holds true when attorneys utilize AI or any other form of technology." Id. The court concluded that sanctions should be imposed only on the attorneys for the defendants (as they had no role in drafting and filing the offending document). Id. at *5. The court also issued the following warning:
Id. at *7. The court ruled that the plaintiff would be awarded all reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by its counsel for time spent in researching and replying to the defendants' response. Id. The court also ordered the defendants' counsel (both lead and local) to attend and complete CLE training on AI usage and to pay fines ($1,000 for lead counsel and $500 for local counsel) to the Registry of the Clerk. Id. The plaintiff's attorney subsequently filed a notice, indicating that fees and costs amounted to $11,881. Versant Funding LLC, No. 17-cv-81140 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2025), ECF No. 391. The court found the proposed amount to be high, expecting the total to be between $2,500 and $5,000. Id. The court ordered the parties' counsel to confer and resolve the issue. Id. After conferring, the parties agreed that the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff’s attorneys for researching and replying to the defendants’ response amounted to $5,000. Joint Notice Regarding Settlement of Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Fees at 2, Versant Funding LLC, No. 17-cv-81140 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2025), ECF No. 393. The court noted counsel's "prompt compliance and cooperation" and closed this particular matter. Versant Funding LLC, No. 17-cv-81140 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2025), ECF No. 394. |
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A former journalist, who released an unaired video of a Fox News star interviewing a controversial performer, was charged in a 14-count indictment with conspiracy and computer fraud for allegedly using credentials to access an unaired archive of footage. Indictment, United States v. Burke, No. 24-cr-00068 (Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 1. On May 13, 2025, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss certain counts of the indictment; however, the motion included significant inaccuracies and misquotations of relevant case law and history. Burke, No. 24-cr-00068, slip op. at 1 (May 15, 2025), ECF No. 124. Specifically, the court chronicled nine examples of non-existent quotes and mis-cited propositions. Id. at 1-3. The court also noted six other instances where the defendant incorrectly attributed quotes to cases or documents. Id. at 3-4. The court struck the defendant's motion to dismiss, permitted the defendant to "file a new version of this motion—without the above-described citation errors but with proper legal support," and ordered the defendant accompany the motion with a separate brief, "explaining how these unprofessional misrepresentations of legal citations occurred and what counsel will do to avoid filing any similarly unacceptable motions again." Id. at 5. At a subsequent status conference, the court addressed the defendant's "revised" motion to dismiss and admonished the defendant for the misrepresentations in the previous filing. Clerk's Minutes, Burke, No. 24-cr-00068, slip op. at 1 (May 20, 2025), ECF No. 127. Docket. |
| In Ramirez v. Humala, No. 24-cv-242, 2025 WL 1384161, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2025), the plaintiff's counsel submitted a response to the defendant's pre-motion filing regarding an anticipated motion to dismiss. The court could not locate four of the plaintiff's case citations, and ordered the plaintiff's counsel to produce copies of the four cases or show cause why she should not be sanctioned for citing non-existent cases. Id. Counsel conceded that the cases did not exist and explained that the fake cases were obtained from using public search resources and AI-based research assistants. Id. A clear Rule 11 violation occurred as counsel failed to read and confirm the existence and validity of the legal authorities. Id. at *2. The court ultimately determined that a sanction at the lower end of the spectrum was appropriate due to counsel's prompt acknowledgment of the mistake, the apologies to the court, and commitment to conducting a comprehensive internal review of citation practices and research protocols to ensure the accuracy of future work product. Id. The court imposed a penalty of $1,000 on counsel and the law firm, and ordered counsel to inform her client of these developments by serving a copy of this order. Id. at *2-3. |
| In Thomas v. Genesee County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 25-cv-10524, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 2025), ECF No. 23, the court addressed a number of motions filed by the pro se plaintiff. The court struck three motions as procedurally defective, denied the motion for appointed counsel without prejudice, and granted the motion to file an amended complaint. Id. at 2-4, 6-7. In so ruling, the court observed that the plaintiff noted that his filing was "done" with AI. Id. at 8. The court opined "[t]hat is a bad idea in one very real and important sense," as the plaintiff remained responsible for the content of his filings under Rule 11 regardless of whether he used AI. Id. |
| In an antitrust action, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. Yelp Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 24-cv-06101, 2025 WL 1168900, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2025), ECF No. 47. The court faced an interesting argument by the defendant that one of the plaintiff's allegations was not factually plausible. Id. at *8. In the complaint, the plaintiff pleaded in part: "[w]hile exact figures can vary ... it's generally estimated that Google holds well over 90% of the market share in local search." Id. (internal quotation omitted). The court noted that the allegation was complicated, as "it was generated by a query to [the defendant] Google's Gemini AI tool." Id. The defendant contended that citing a GAI tool was implausible and that relying uncritically on content generated by such a tool could mislead the courts. Id. The court recognized that reliance on AI tools may lead to errors and misrepresentations, and the defendant expressed legitimate concerns about “pleading-by-bot,” but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and local rules did not prohibit such use of AI. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The court noted that the Federal Rules do not require pleadings to contain any citations to evidence, and a party was free to make uncited claims so long as the good faith requirements of Rule 11 were satisfied. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 & 11(b)). Because the defendant did not argue that the plaintiff's query was an unreasonable inquiry under the circumstances and did not move for sanctions, the court declined to address the Rule 11 implications of the plaintiff's use of AI in its pleading. Id. |
| In an action arising from the defendant's debt collection efforts, the pro se plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against the defendant. Marion v. Hollis Cobb Assocs., Inc., No. 24-cv-2582, 2025 WL 1275828, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2025), ECF No. 34. The matter was referred to the magistrate judge to for a recommendation on the defendant's partial motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy (also referred to as intrusion of seclusion). Id. at *2. The magistrate judge found that the plaintiff failed to plead facts to establish extreme and outrageous conduct necessary for the IIED claim, and did not allege facts sufficient to state a claim for invasion of privacy under an intrusion upon seclusion theory. Id. at *3-5. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended that the defendant's motion to dismiss both counts should be granted. Id. at *5. In reaching a conclusion, the magistrate judge observed that the plaintiff relied upon a mis-cited case that did not support the principle upon which the plaintiff relied. Id. at *5. The court found that the case, which corresponded to the cited reporter, had nothing to do with IIED or invasion of privacy. Id. The magistrate judge suspected that the mis-cited case was related to an AI-hallucination, and ordered the plaintiff to produce a true and accurate copy of the case; failure to do so would trigger an order to show cause why the plaintiff should not be sanctioned under Rule 11. Id. The plaintiff responded to the order, indicating that the error in her submission was most likely due to making a mistake in attempting to reference a case from a different jurisdiction (from a different reporter). Marion, No. 24-cv-2582, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2025), ECF No. 39. Finding her explanation to be satisfactory, the magistrate judge ruled that her mistake did not justify the imposition of sanctions. Id. |
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In Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 24-cv-7399, 2025 WL 582733, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025), the plaintiff's reply brief cited nonbinding, out-of-circuit cases from federal courts without citing a single decision from the district court in which this case was pending. After thoroughly examining the brief, the court found that five of the seven cases cited by the plaintiff's attorney in the brief were non-existent. Id. The court expressed "serious concerns" that the attorney appeared to make misrepresentations in a sworn affirmation by citing non-existent cases or failed to diligently cite check the submission. Id. at *2. The court ordered the attorney to provide copies of all cases cited in the plaintiff's filings (including the brief at issue) by February 28, 2025. Id. The attorney subsequently admitted that the cases in the offending brief did not exist and should not have been cited. Declaration Regarding Cases Cited in Plaintiff’s Memoranda, Benjamin, No. 24-cv-7399, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2025), ECF No. 30. In the subsequent order imposing sanctions, the court noted clients expect their attorneys to vigorously pursue their cases, make persuasive arguments, and work efficiently, while courts expect attorneys' submissions to be accurate and supported by appropriate legal authority. Benjamin, No. 24-cv-7399, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2025), ECF No. 36. The court found: "None of that happened here." Id. The plaintiff's counsel explained how the brief was prepared and admitted that she used ChatOn to produce the brief, which included five phony case citations. Id. at *5-6. Further, she spent 20 minutes reviewing ChatOn's work and did not check any of the AI-generated cases. Id. at *8. In a lengthy 17-page order, the court found that counsel's "conduct was undoubtedly grossly negligent," and that she acted in subjective bad faith. Id. at *14, 16. The court also recognized that counsel repeatedly expressed remorse, this appears to be her sole instance of substituting AI for her legal judgment, and noted her proactive engagement and financial investment in CLE courses on this subject. Id. at *17. Accordingly, the court imposed sanctions in the amount of $1,000. Id. |
| In Nichols v. Walmart, Inc., No. 24-CV-00236, 2025 WL 1178592, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2025), the district court reviewed the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss the pro se plaintiff's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to impose sanctions for her use of fake case citations. In her objection to the magistrate's recommendation, the plaintiff conceded that the cited caselaw was fake, but her filing was not made in bad faith. Id. at *2. However, the district court determined that the plaintiff's inability to explain her use of non-existent legal authority and her attempts to shift blame for her wrongdoing strongly favored Rule 11 sanctions. Id. In light of the plaintiff's assertions of indigency and the dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds, the district court determined that dismissal was a suitable Rule 11 sanction. Id. |
| In Ferlito v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 20-cv-5615, 2025 WL 1181699, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2025), the plaintiff alleged that an axe purchased from the defendant was defectively designed. The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff's expert, in part, because the expert "entered a query into ChatGPT about the best way to secure a hammer head to a handle, which produced a response consistent with his expert opinion." Id. In examining the proposed expert's qualifications under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the court found that the expert's testimony was sufficiently reliable to present to the jury. Id. at *3. The court considered the usage of ChatGPT and referenced the Kohls decision, which highlighted an expert's affidavit that included AI-generated citations to non-existent academic articles. Id. at *4. While the AI-generated material in Kohls shattered the expert's credibility, the court observed in the instant case that there was little risk that the expert's "use of ChatGPT impaired his judgment regarding proper methods for securing the maul's head to its handle." Id. |
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In Bevins v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 25-cv-576, 2025 WL 1085695, at *1, 8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2025), the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint alleging unfair trade practices, negligence, breach of warranty, and products liability. In reviewing the matter, the court found that the plaintiff's filings contained two problematic citations—specifically, the court could not locate the case citations. Id. at *6. Subsequently, the court ordered the plaintiff's attorney to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed for the inclusion of these cases in the briefs. Id. After some unconvincing explanations by the attorney, the court crafted a unique penalty without including monetary sanctions. Id. at *7. First, the court referred the matter for consideration by the Pennsylvania State Bar and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Bar. Id. Next, the court struck the attorney's appearance in this case with prejudice due to violations of Rule 11(b)(2) and the court's standing order. Id. Finally, the court ordered the attorney to inform the plaintiff of the sanctions, and if she chooses to refile her case, she must find new counsel. Id. |
| In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant law firm failed to timely file a responsive pleading, which resulted in a default judgment against the plaintiff. Iron Tax, Acct. & Fin. Sols., LLC v. Story Law Firm, P.L.L.C., No. 23-CV-5243, 2025 WL 1070771, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2025). In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment (as well as ruling on other pre-trial motions), the court noted several instances where the plaintiff's present counsel misquoted, misrepresented, and miscited case law. Id. at *1, 7 n.2. The court opined: "short of the misuse of AI, it is unclear how such errors would slip past a reasonably diligent attorney . . . in the context of a legal malpractice suit, such errors are ironically glaring." Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment, id. at *7, and made no formal ruling or order with respect to the problematic AI usage. |
| In Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. Inc., No. 5:24-CV-388, 2025 WL 1057211, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2025), the court addressed the defendant's motion to dismiss the pro se plaintiff's complaint alleging violations of state and federal law, as well as numerous motions by the plaintiff. The court denied all of the plaintiff's motions with the exception of his request for additional time to respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. In the order, the court noted that the plaintiff may be using AI to research and draft his motions, as he cited several cases that appear to be fabricated. Id. at *3. The court reminded the plaintiff to verify any cited case to be in fact real, and not AI-generated. Id. The court also warned the plaintiff that he may incur a substantial penalty for failing to comply with Rule 11 requirements. Id. |
| In An v. Archblock, Inc., No. 2024-0102, 2025 WL 1024661, at *1, 3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2025), the court dismissed the pro se petitioner's motion to compel discovery. The court discerned that the petitioner's motion was replete with miscites, suspecting use of GAI to prepare the motion. Id. at *1-2. The court was leaning towards dismissing the motion without prejudice; however, the petitioner insisted that, while some language in the citations was paraphrased, the principles from the cited cases are directly relevant and applicable. Id. at *2. As a result, the court denied the motion with prejudice. Id. The court cautioned the petitioner that failure to ensure future filings are truthful, accurate, and compliant with court requirements, including the necessary certification regarding the use of GAI, may lead to sanctions such as monetary penalties, stricken filings, or the dismissal of this suit. Id. |
| In an appeal of a trial court's denial of the pro se appellant's motion to set aside a settlement agreement, the court concluded that the appellant demonstrated no right to relief. Ford v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 24-50053, 2025 WL 1008537, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025). In reaching a conclusion, the court noted that the appellant cited no legitimate authority to support any of the issues raised on appeal, constituting a waiver of those issues. Id. The court also noted that the appellant's brief cited five non-existent cases, which amounted to an abuse of the adversary system. Id. at *1 n.1 (citing Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024) and Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)). |
| In a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner's counsel purportedly hired a freelance attorney to write a response to a show cause order. Dehghani v. Castro, 25-cv-0052, 2025 WL 988009, at *1-2 (D.N.M. Apr. 2, 2025). The petitioner's counsel indicated that his revisions to the freelance attorney's draft were minimal, and he did not review the case law or verify the cases cited in support of the propositions before signing and filing the response brief. Id. at *2. The petitioner's counsel acknowledged there were at least six non-existent cases, which were likely the result of AI hallucinations. Id. at *4. For guidance i imposing sanctions, the court looked to Wadsworth, Gauthier, Bunce, Hayes, and HoosierVac. Id. at *5. The court recognized that the instant case was similar to Wadsworth, where the attorney took remedial action, acted with transparency, and demonstrated contrition. Id. The court ordered the petitioner's counsel to pay a fine of $1,500, to complete a one-hour CLE-credited program related to legal ethics in the use of AI, to self-report to the New Mexico and Texas state bars disciplinary boards, to send a copy of this order to the freelance attorney (and supervisory staff), and to report the freelance attorney to the appropriate state bar disciplinary board. Id. |
| In Boggess v. Chamness, No. 25-cv-64, 2025 WL 978992, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2025), the court addressed a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to dismiss the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff objected to the finding that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at *2. On review, the court noted that the plaintiff relied on a non-existent case for one of her objections. Id. The court observed that the citation was probably the result of an AI hallucination. Id. The court cited Local Rule CV-11(g), stating that AI tools may generate factual and legal inaccuracies, and pro se litigants are bound by the court’s rules and the standards articulated under Rule 11. Id. The court overruled this objection and noted that the plaintiff’s false statement of law in her objections was sanctionable (although the court declined to impose sanctions). Id. The court overruled the plaintiff's other objection, adopted the report and recommendation, and dismissed the plaintiff's case with prejudice. Id. at *3. |
| In a discrimination and retaliation action, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to present a claim and for dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for the pro se plaintiff's "repeated use of falsified legal authority in her filings." McKeown v. Paycom Payroll LLC, No. CIV-24-301, 2025 WL 978221, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2025). Ultimately, the court was not convinced that the plaintiff's explanation for using non-existent legal authority was credible, as she made no effort to provide any existing cases that she might have been using. Id. at *9. Importantly, the court stated that the plaintiff's pro se status did not justify using non-existent legal authority, particularly since she had already been warned that such behavior would not be tolerated. Id. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion. Id. Nevertheless, the court was unwilling to dismiss the plaintiff's claims with prejudice as a sanction; however, the court warned the plaintiff "that any future references to falsified legal authority will result in sanctions, such as filing restrictions, monetary penalties, or dismissal of her case." Id. |
| In Sanders v. United States, No. 24-cv-1301, 2025 WL 957666, at *1, 3 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 31, 2025), the court dismissed the pro se plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff's filings contained citations to several non-existent cases. Id. at *4. In ruling, the court opined that the plaintiff's excessive reliance on AI compromised her ability to effectively represent herself, leading her to overlook the strongest arguments for her claim due to being misled by fabricated cases. Id. at *5. Although sanctions were not imposed in this case, the court warned the plaintiff (and future litigants) that including citations to non-existent cases in any filings may lead to sanctions, such as striking the filings, imposing filing restrictions, monetary penalties, or even dismissing the action. Id. |
| In Kruglyak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 22-cv- 00024, 2025 WL 900621, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2025), the pro se plaintiff cited fictitious cases and misrepresented the rulings of various cases in a reply brief submitted to the court. In his response to the court's show-cause order, he acknowledged including fictitious cases and the mischaracterizations of case holdings. Id. However, he claimed that this was not intended to mislead the court or gain an unfair advantage. Id. Rather, he relied in good faith on publicly available, free GAI platforms for legal research. Moreover, at the time he filed the pleading, he was unaware that GAI platforms could produce fictitious or inaccurate case citations. Id. The court ruled that sanctions were unnecessary, as the plaintiff's actions, though negligent, did not demonstrate bad faith, either subjectively or objectively. Id. at *3. |
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In Williams v. Capital One Bank, N.A., No. 24-cv-2032, 2025 WL 843285, at *3, 7 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2025), the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the pro se plaintiff's action, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionability claims. In reaching a conclusion, the court also addressed the plaintiff's citation of non-existent authority in his brief. Id. at *3, 7. The court stated that it is unacceptable for parties to submit filings containing citations to legal authority that do not exist, regardless of whether they were drafted with AI assistance. Id. at *7. While the court noted that other courts imposed sanctions against pro se litigants for similar transgressions, the plaintiff was strongly warned against filing briefs with fabricated case citations in any future filings. Id. |
| In a pro se appeal of an administrative denial of unemployment benefits, the court rejected the appellant's arguments as inapposite to controlling authority and stated that the cases she cited did not exist. Stevens v. BJC Health Sys., No. ED 112759, 2025 WL 837691, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2025). In concluding, the court "warn[ed] litigants that using artificial intelligence to draft a legal document may lead to sanctions if the user fails to perform a critical review of the end-product to ensure that fictitious legal authorities or citations do not appear in filings with this Court or any other court." Id. at *2 n.1. |
| In this pro se plaintiffs' case involving breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and misrepresentation, negligence, obstruction of justice, breach of contract, and conversion, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice. Alkuda v. McDonald Hopkins Co., L.P.A., No. 24-cv-1103, 2025 WL 843403, at *1, 5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2025). In reaching a conclusion, the court recognized the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff's "opposition brief contained fictitious, AI-generated legal citations." Id. at *5 n.5. Rather than impose sanctions, the court put the plaintiffs "on notice that any further submissions of fictitious legal citations to a court may result in dismissal or other sanctions, including monetary penalties." Id. |
| In Nguyen v. Savage Enters., No. 24-CV-00815, 2025 WL 679024, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 3, 2025), the court imposed a sanction of $1,000 on the plaintiff for citing non-existent authority in support of her response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. In the response, the plaintiff cited four cases that did not exist. See Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Response in Opposition to Defendant Savage Enterprises’ Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, Nguyen, No. 24-CV-00815, at *38-40, 42-46 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 16, 2025), ECF No. 47. The court ordered the plaintiff to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for citing non-existent authority. Order, Nguyen, No. 24-CV-00815, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 19, 2025), ECF No. 55. In response to the show cause order, the plaintiff’s attorney stated that “[a]t one point AI had been used to assist in research [and] [i]t appears that some bad case law from that time may have crept into research files and got passed into this brief.” Response to the Order to Show Cause, Nguyen, No. 24-CV-00815, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 26, 2025), ECF No. 56. In an exercise of discretion, the court concluded that the Rule 11 violation warranted “a reasonable sanction.” Nguyen, No. 24-CV-00815, at *2. The reasonable sanction amounted to $1,000, which was “on the low end of the range of sanctions imposed on others who have engaged in similar conduct.” Id. |
| In Bunce v. Visual Tech. Innovations, Inc., No. 23-1740, 2025 WL 662398, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2025), an attorney filed two motions containing non-existent cases that the court found to be AI hallucinations. The motions were filed on January 14, 2025. Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for All Defendants, Bunce, No. 23-1740, ECF No. 131; Motion for Leave to Appeal of Sanctions of Defense Counsel, Bunce, No. 23-1740, ECF No. 132. At a show cause hearing to explain the filing deficiencies, the attorney indicated that he used ChatGPT, which was “fairly new” to him, for the filings at issue. Bunce, No. 23-1740, at *3. The court noted that the attorney did not review the bogus cases because “he ‘never in [his] wildest dreams’ thought ChatGPT could manufacture artificial cases to very conveniently support the exact outcomes he desired.” Id. at *3. In issuing sanctions, the court sought to deter the attorney (and other attorneys) "from credulously assuming AI can stand in place of an attorney's obligations under Rule 11." Id. at *4. Ultimately, the court ordered the attorney to pay a $2,500 penalty and to complete “a one-hour CLE-credited seminar or educational program related to both AI and legal ethics.” Id. |
| Another reminder to avoid blindly trusting AI citations comes from Wyoming. Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489 (D. Wyo. 2025). At the beginning of the opinion, the court emphasized that attorneys still have a duty to verify their sources and conduct a reasonable inquiry into applicable laws, especially in a legal landscape increasingly influenced by AI. Id. at 493. Here, the issue involved whether the plaintiffs’ attorneys should be sanctioned for filing motions in limine that contained citations to eight non-existent cases. Id. In making a ruling, the court considered the roles of the plaintiffs’ three attorneys: the drafting attorney, the supervising attorney, and local counsel. Id. at 493-94. The drafting attorney was the driving force, as he drafted the motions and uploaded the material into his firm’s in-house database with the intention to obtain “more case law,” among other queries. Id. The queries generated fictitious cases, which were included in the motions by the drafting attorney without any verification. Id. at 494. The supervising attorney and local counsel played no role in the drafting or preparation of the motions, but they did affix their e-signatures (along with the drafting attorney) at the bottom of the motions. Id. In making the ruling, the court acknowledged the longstanding general rule that “[t]he attorney must ‘stop, look, and listen’ before signing a document subject to Rule 11.” Id. at 495 (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1987)). In a fact-specific analysis, the court carved out individual sanctions for each of the attorneys: a $3,000 sanction and revocation of his pro hac vice admission for the drafting attorney, a $1,000 sanction for the supervising attorney, and a $1,000 sanction for local counsel. Id. at 497-99. |
| In a pro se plaintiff's civil rights action, the court considered the defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice, considering numerous procedural deficiencies and allegations of fabricated case citations. Saxena v. Martinez-Hernandez, No. 22-cv-02126, 2025 WL 522234, at *1-2 (D. Nev. Feb. 18, 2025). In determining whether dismissal with prejudice was appropriate, the court also considered less drastic alternatives. Id. at *5. The court concluded that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate, focusing on the plaintiff's severely deficient filings. Id. The court recognized that even with leniency afforded to pro se litigants, the plaintiff "cannot be reasonably expected to present coherent claims, adhere to [the court's] orders, or present honest argument to this court." Id. In reaching a decision, the court declined to issue a show cause order to determine why the plaintiff should not face sanctions for failing to cite proper legal authority and for misrepresenting the non-existent authority. Id. |
| In an antitrust claim, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Greenflight Venture Corp. v. Google LLC, No. 24-CV-80395, 2025 WL 385476, at *3, 11 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2025). In reaching its conclusion, the court addressed the plaintiffs' five claims. Id. at *5-11. AI hallucinations entered the court's sightlines with the plaintiffs' fifth claim, alleging an antitrust “duopoly” claim against Google and Apple for “dominat[ing] all meaningful channels” of the internet. Id. at *10 (internal quotation omitted). The court observed that many courts rejected the "duopoly" concept as a matter of law (it is axiomatic that "that monopoly means one, not two"). Id. Instead of acknowledging the lack of legal authority for the claim, the plaintiffs relied on a quote that was either fabricated or imagined. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff quoted a seminal case on antitrust, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), to support the claim. Greenflight Venture Corp., No. 24-CV-80395, 2025 WL 385476, at *10. After a thorough review, the court determined that the quoted material was not present in American Tobacco, and the opinion's text did not support the plaintiffs' quotation. Id. The case was unusual for another reason, as it involved a corporate plaintiff and a pro se plaintiff. Id. at *11. The court noted that the proceedings were stayed against the pro se plaintiff, although the pro se plaintiff signed the second amended complaint. Id. the court's ruling dismissed the corporate plaintiff's claims, but ordered the plaintiff to show cause why his pro se claims should not be dismissed for the same reasons the corporate plaintiff's (identical) antitrust claims were dismissed. Id. |
| The court held a hearing to determine if sanctions should be imposed on the plaintiff's attorney for filing a brief that included cases that do not exist, erroneously cited cases, and cases that were real but stood for different legal propositions than those represented. Gonzalez v. Tex. Taxpayers & Rsch. Ass’n, 24-CV-880, at *1-2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2025). While initially denying any AI usage, the attorney later admitted to using "Lexis Nexis's AI citation generator." Id. at *2. The attorney attributed the majority of errors in the brief to clerical and administrative mistakes made by his support staff when they transcribed his notes into the final version of the brief. Id. After reviewing the record, the arguments from the hearing, and the relevant law, the court concluded to levy a monetary sanction on the attorney equal to the defendant's expenses and costs associated with responding to and addressing matters due to the attorney's miscues. Id. at *3. Regardless of any AI errors, the court found that the submitted brief contained numerous technical and substantive mistakes, which hindered the defendant's ability to effectively respond to the plaintiff's brief. Id. at *4. The court also considered the attorney's initial denial of AI usage. Id. Accordingly, the court ordered the attorney to pay opposing counsel's fees of $3,852.50 and costs of $108.54. Id. |
| In a case involving an alleged First Amendment violation, the court addressed the pro se plaintiff's motion to compel discovery. Sheets v. Presseller, No. 24-cv-495, 2025 WL 770592, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2025), ECF No. 110. The court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff's requests were overly broad; the court also found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the particular requests were relevant. Id. at *1-2. In reaching a conclusion, the court noted that the defendant claimed that the plaintiff relied on GAI "to draft discovery, emails, and pleadings rather than conferring in good faith." Id. at *2. The court surmised that the plaintiff's correspondence included cases that did not support his position, along with one case that the defendant could not locate. Id. The court opined that while the plaintiff did not present non-existent cases in his court filings, the court warned him that any filings with non-existent cases may be met with sanctions. Id. |
| In Arajuo v. Wedelstadt, No. 23-C-1190, 2025 WL 263529, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2025), the plaintiff asserted a claim of property loss, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and unfair trade practice by defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint failed to name a real party in interest as required by the federal rules. Id. Before addressing the merits of the case, the court addressed the conduct by the defendants' attorney. Id. In the defendants' summary judgment brief, the attorney included citations to non-existent cases. Id. The attorney admitted to using a “new legal research medium,” asserting that he had not previously used the medium and that “[e]ither this medium was corrupt, or the site had been otherwise compromised.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The attorney also filed an amended brief, which omitted the non-existent cases. Id. The court stated that the use of the AI-generated fake case citations was unacceptable, warning that future filings citing non-existent cases may lead to sanctions. Id. |
| In a criminal case, defense counsel submitted a fictitious case and quotation in his motion to unseal, as well as knowingly making misleading statements in his corresponding reply and at a subsequent hearing. United States v. Hayes, No. 2:24-cr-0280, 2025 WL 235531, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2025). The court found that these inaccuracies were deliberate and made in bad faith. Id. Despite having several opportunities to address his mistakes, the defense counsel did not make the necessary corrections. Id. While the court accepted a belated apology, the defense counsel’s later acknowledgment of the fictitious case demonstrated that his conduct was intentional. Id. Notwithstanding the foregoing findings and other subsequent dubious filings by the defense counsel, the court concluded that a sanction of $1,500 was proportionate to the defense counsel's conduct while also serving as an effective deterrent and ensuring no possible impact or prejudice on the defense's client. Id. at *15. |
| In Kohls v. Ellison, No. 24-cv-3754, 2025 WL 66514, at *1, 3 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2025), the plaintiffs sought to exclude the defendant’s expert declaration from a professor at Stanford University, who focused on AI and misinformation. The professor used GPT-4o in preparing a declaration, which included fake citations. Id. at *3. Specifically, the declaration cited two fictitious academic articles and misattributed the authorship of a third article. Id. The court observed that the attorneys needed to show greater diligence and pay more attention to a document submitted under penalty of perjury. Id. The court highlighted the irony of relying on AI in a case about AI's dangers, but did not fault the professor for using AI for research. Id. at *3-4. The court emphasized the importance of verifying AI-generated content in legal documents and ultimately excluded the professor's declaration from consideration in the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at *5. |