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Authentication & Verification While attorneys are not required to become AI experts, they should have a reasonable understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the specific AI technology they use in the practice of law. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 512 (2024). Attorneys must "stop, look, and listen" before signing a document subject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1987). Rule 11 provides that legal claims must be based on existing law or present a valid argument for changing the law. Accordingly, Rule 11 requires attorneys to verify the existence and validity of the legal authorities on which they rely. Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024). Several cases, beginning with Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, (S.D.N.Y. 2023), created a compendium of cautionary tales warning against blind reliance on AI assistance for lawyering tasks. Dismissal, monetary sanctions, award of attorney's fees, referrals for disciplinary action, and the exclusion of evidence have been used to discourage blind reliance on AI-generated content. Attorneys must understand both the capabilities and limitations of AI. They should “stop, look, and listen” before submitting legal documents and recognize that the appearance of credibility does not replace the need for thorough authentication and verification. As the legal landscape continues to evolve with the integration of AI, it is essential for attorneys to prioritize ethical practices and maintain a deep understanding of the various risks associated with AI. * Apologies to John Keats (La Belle Dame Sans Merci) |
AI Adoption in Corporate Law Grows Contract-related tasks are the most common applications of AI, with 64 percent of users utilizing tools for contract drafting, reviewing, and analysis. Legal research follows as the second most frequent use case at 49 percent, while document translation is used by 38 percent of users. Among the various platforms employed by legal departments, ChatGPT is particularly notable, with 74 percent of AI users reporting its adoption. However, there are still significant knowledge gaps that need to be addressed, including the necessity for improved training and skill development, concerns regarding AI accuracy and reliability, and the absence of clear regulatory guidelines. See Robert Ambrogi, Legal Departments Show Growing AI Adoption But Implementation Challenges Remain, LawSites (Jun. 5, 2025). |
| Two cases from the Southern District of New York set the tone for considering sanctions when attorneys used AI-generated unverified case citations. In both cases, the courts exercised discretion in imposing sanctions (Mata) and declining to impose sanctions (Cohen). In both cases, the courts considered traditional jurisprudential standards for Rule 11 from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and local rules. |
| Mata v. Avianca, Inc. |
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The ruling in Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) launched a niche area of sanctions for AI-generated citation fabrications. In Mata, the attorneys were sanctioned after submitting fake judicial opinions with fabricated quotes and citations, with one attorney found to have acted in bad faith for not verifying the cited cases and another attorney for intentionally avoiding confirmation of their existence. Id. at 448, 464–66. At the outset, the court observed “[m]any harms flow from the submission of fake opinions” before conducting a deep examination of the filings at issue. Id. at 448 (the court's findings of fact covered ten pages in the reported decision). The court's analysis of the attorneys' conduct under the standards set forth by Rule 11 was equally comprehensive. Id. at 459-66. Ultimately, the court concluded that a penalty of $5,000 was sufficient “to advance the goals of specific and general deterrence.” Id. at 466. As this section details, Mata has not been an isolated incident. Courts across the country are discovering AI-generated fabrications in legal filings. The litany of cases involving sanctions related to AI indicates that the legal profession blindly created a crisis due to negligence. Attorneys are entering sensitive client information into ChatGPT and other GAI tools, asking AI to draft motions without proper verification, and treating LLMs like traditional legal research platforms such as Westlaw or Lexis. |
| United States v. Cohen |
| After pleading guilty to evading income taxes, lying to banks and Congress, and violating campaign finance laws, the defendant filed several motions for early termination of his term of supervised release. United States v. Cohen, 724 F. Supp. 3d 251, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). The fourth motion raised the question whether sanctions should be imposed for that motion's citation to three non-existent cases. Id. In the motion, the defendant's counsel cited and described three ‘‘examples’’ of decisions granting early termination of supervised release that the Second Circuit allegedly affirmed. Id. at 254. The defendant (a disbarred attorney) obtained the cases using Google Bard and provided the cases to counsel, who included the cases in the motion. Id. The defendant believed Google Bard to be a ‘‘super-charged search engine," and not a generative AI service like Chat-GPT. Id. The defendant "trusted" that counsel would vet the additions before including them in the motion. Id. at 254-55. The court considered whether the defendant's counsel acted in bad faith to determine whether sanctions should be imposed. Id. at 258. The court explained that it could only impose sanctions under its inherent authority if there is clear and convincing evidence that a party or counsel knowingly submitted a materially false or misleading filing or knowingly failed to correct false statements. Id. Importantly, this must be part of a deliberate and unconscionable scheme to obstruct the court’s ability to adjudicate the case fairly. Id. While the court found counsel's citation to non-existent cases to be embarrassing and certainly negligent (perhaps even grossly negligent), it ruled that sanctions would not be imposed on counsel. Id. at 258-59. In reaching a decision, the court noted that while the defendant was not subject to the show cause order regarding sanctions, the court opined that sanctions would not be warranted. Id. at 259. The court noted that the defendant was a party to the case and, as a disbarred attorney, was not an officer of the court. Id. Thus, he was entitled to rely on his counsel and to trust his counsel’s professional judgment. Id. |
| In re Martin (United States Bankruptcy Court—Northern District of Illinois) |
| In a dispute between the debtor and one of the creditors, the bankruptcy court addressed the creditor's plan objection and the debtor's corresponding response. In re Martin, No. 24-bk-13368, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 11, 2025), ECF No. 56. In the response brief, the debtor argued that the creditor lacked standing to object to the plan's treatment of other creditors if it did not directly affect the creditor. Id. The debtor cited four cases to support this argument; however, the court found these cases to be problematic. Id. at 1-3. Upon reviewing the cases, the court determined that none contained the legal authority that the debtor relied upon, noting that one case did not exist at all. Id. at 3. The court expressed concern that if the debtor's counsel fabricated quotations to mislead both the creditor and the court, this would raise serious issues. Id. Furthermore, the court remarked that if these fabricated quotations originated from unchecked AI sources rather than honest research errors, the situation would be even more alarming. Id. The court referenced several now-infamous cases where the use of AI by counsel led to citations of non-existent authorities, resulting in sanctions. Id. Although the court acknowledged that the debtor's citations to seemingly fabricated quotations supported a non-controversial proposition, the apparent misconduct of the debtor's counsel could not be dismissed. Id. Consequently, the court ordered counsel to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed for submitting a brief that appeared to contain manufactured case law. Id. at 3-4. |
| Johnson v. Dunn (United States District Court—Northern District of Alabama) |
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In a ten-count complaint, an incarcerated plaintiff alleged Eighth Amendment deprivations and negligence against the defendants (prison officials and officers with the Alabama Department of Corrections). Complaint at 1-2, 34, 45, 49, 51, 55, 58, 60, 63, 64, 77, Johnson v. Dunn, No. 21-cv-01701 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 27, 2021), ECF No. 1. During discovery, the defendant moved to depose the plaintiff; the plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis that counsel could not adequately prepare to present the plaintiff in the specified time frame and that the defendant cited "no legitimate authority" to support the proposition that such a deposition was appropriate. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Leave to Depose Incarcerated Persons, at 1, Johnson, No. 21-cv-01701 (N.D. Ala. May 15, 2025), ECF No. 186 (emphasis in original). The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's argument supporting the appropriateness of such a deposition was fabricated: the defendant's legal authority "appear[ed] to have been made up out of whole cloth." Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). The plaintiff accused the defendant of fabricating case law and argued that the defendant's motion should be denied for failing to cite any legitimate case law to support their position. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). The court conducted an independent investigation of the case citations in the defendant's motion and could not locate the cases. Johnson, No. 21-cv-01701, 2025 WL 1465778, at *1 (N.D. Ala. May 16, 2025), ECF No. 187. The court issued a show cause order as to why sanctions should not be imposed "for making false statements of fact or law." In issuing the order, the court noted that four attorneys signed the defendant's motion. Id. Following a subsequent show cause hearing, the court ordered initial briefing to be completed by June 2, 2025. Johnson, No. 21-cv-01701 (N.D. Ala. May 21, 2025), ECF No. 199). Docket. |
| Lacey v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (U.S. District Court—Central District of California) |
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An insurance coverage dispute, where the plaintiff alleged breach of contract and bad faith by the defendant, would result in one of the most severe AI-sanction cases reported thus far. See Complaint attached as Exhibit A to Defendant's Notice of Removal, at 3-4, 16-17, Lacey v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. 24-cv-5205 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 1-1. During the proceedings, the court appointed a special master to facilitate discovery. Lacey, No. 24-cv-5205, 2025 WL 1363069, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2025), ECF No. 119. The parties submitted briefs regarding the discovery issue; the plaintiff's supplemental brief contained numerous problematic legal citations and quotations. Id. The special master immediately recognized that "the source of this problem was the inappropriate use of, and reliance on, AI tools." Id. at *3. As the special master investigated the matter, involving two law firms acting on the plaintiff's behalf, it was revealed that an attorney at one firm used AI tools to prepare research for the brief, and that document contained the problematic material. Id. The other firm used the research to prepare and file the brief. Id. Those attorneys did not know that the researching attorney used AI; moreover, they did not ask that attorney to use AI. Id. However, the special master found that "[n]o attorney or staff member at either firm apparently cite-checked or otherwise reviewed [the] research before filing the brief." Id. Ultimately, the special master determined that bad faith existed and imposed sanctions. Id. at *7-8. In making a decision, the special master opined: Even with recent advances, no reasonably competent attorney should out-source research and writing to this technology—particularly without any attempt to verify the accuracy of that material. And sending that material to other lawyers without disclosing its sketchy AI origins realistically put those professionals in harm’s way. Id. at *7. Ultimately, the special master imposed severe sanctions. First, the special master struck the plaintiff’s filings on the discovery issue. Id. at *8. Next, the special master noted the court’s order requiring the defendant to pay the costs associated with the discovery issue. Id. However, that order also expressly authorized the special master to shift fees if appropriate; the special master opted to do so, ordering the plaintiff’s attorneys to pay the fees (approximately $26,1000). Id. Finally, the special master considered ordering the plaintiff’s attorneys to compensate the defendant for time spent preparing related briefs. Id. at *9. While the defendant’s attorneys attested that the fees approached $25,000, the special master directed the plaintiff’s attorneys to pay the defense $5,000 for incurred fees. Id. The special master specifically reflected that the plaintiff was not at fault for “the AI debacle,” but she “will bear this outcome as a consequence of her lawyers’ actions.” Id. at *10. Accordingly, the special master reiterated that the attorneys would be responsible for the monetary awards set forth in the order. Id. See Robert Ambrogi, AI Hallucinations Strike Again: Two More Cases Where Lawyers Face Judicial Wrath for Fake Citations, LawSites (May 14, 2025). Docket. |
| Concord Music Group, Inc. v. Anthropic PBC (U.S. District Court—Northern District of California) |
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In a copyright infringement action, the plaintiffs sought to address the systematic and widespread infringement of their copyrighted song lyrics by the defendant Anthropic; the defendant used the plaintiffs' materials to train its AI model Claude. Complaint at 5, 49-57, Concord Music Group, Inc. v. Anthropic PBC, No. 24-cv-52051 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 1. A dispute arose over an Anthropic data scientist's citation to a non-existent academic article, which bolstered the defendant's argument in a discovery dispute. Concord Music Group, No. 24-cv-52051 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2025), ECF No. 360. The court ordered the parties to submit additional documentation to resolve the dispute. Concord Music Group, No. 24-cv-52051 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2025), ECF No. 364. See Blake Brittain, Anthropic expert accused of using AI-fabricated source in copyright case, Reuters (May 13, 2025). Docket. |
| Coomer v. Lindell (U.S. District Court—Colorado) |
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Allegations of janky AI arose in a former Dominion Voting Systems executive's defamation case against MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell. See Thy Vo, Judge Orders MyPillow Attys To Explain AI Use, Fake Citations, Law360 (Apr. 23, 2025). With the trial approaching, the defendants’ brief in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion in limine roused suspicion when the court identified nearly 30 defective citations. Coomer v. Lindell, No. 22-cv-01129, slip op. at 3 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2025), ECF No. 309. The court noted several errors in the brief, including misquotations of cited cases and misrepresentations of legal principles related to those cases. Id. This included discussions of the legal principles not appearing in the decisions cited. Id. There were also inaccuracies concerning whether certain case law originated from a binding authority, such as the Tenth Circuit, and misattributions of case law to the District Court of Colorado. Id. Most notably, the court highlighted the "most egregious" error, which was the citation of cases that do not exist. Id. Even though the court presented the opportunity to explain how the brief was replete with such fundamental errors, the defendants' counsel declined to offer any explanation. Id. After much obfuscation, the court directly asked the defendants' counsel if the brief was a product of GAI; only then did counsel admit to the use of GAI. Id. at 4. The court ordered the defendants, the law firm representing the defendants, and the individual attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed and why the individual attorneys should not be referred for disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 5-6. Per the court's ruling, the defendants' counsel must show cause in writing by May 5, 2025. Id. at 6. Meanwhile, the defendants sought to delay a June defamation trial because of the pending sanctions determination for using phony case citations. Defendants' Motion to Amend/Correct/Modify Pretrial Order, Coomer, No. 22-cv-01129 (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2025), ECF No. 312. After conducting an extensive analysis, the court denied the defendants' motion to continue the trial. Coomer, No. 22-cv-01129, slip op. at 1-3 (D. Colo. May 14, 2025), ECF No. 334. In arguing for a continuance, the defendants asserted that the court's show cause order imposed a “significant distraction from trial preparation.” Id. at 1 (internal quotation omitted). The court observed that the show cause order "would not have issued so close to trial—or at all—had Defendants reviewed their filing at any point between its submission and the Final Pretrial/Trial Preparation Conference or filed a properly cited brief in the first instance." Id. at 2. With respect to the defendants' concern for a tainted jury pool, the court noted that "voir dire can and should be used to address these concerns." Id. at 3. Ultimately, the court ruled that all of the factors used to determine whether a trial should be continued weighed against ruling in favor of the defendants. Id. at 3-4. See also Rogers v. Andrus Transp. Servs., 502 F.3d 1147, 11151 (10th Cir. 2007) (articulating the "four factors that must be examined to determine whether a trial should be continued"). See also Robin Shea, AI hallucinations cause bad trip for lawyers, JDSupra (May 2, 2025). Docket. |
| Puerto Rico Soccer League NFP, Corp. v. Federacion Puertorriquena de Futbol (U.S. District Court—Puerto Rico) |
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In Puerto Rico Soccer League NFP, Corp. v. Federacion Puertorriquena de Futbol, No. 23-cv-01203 (D.P.R. Apr. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to restrict sanctioned tournaments and matches in Puerto Rico, thereby stifling competition and limiting the growth of independent leagues. The plaintiffs filed several documents leading up to a settlement conference. See Puerto Rico Soccer League, No. 23-cv-01203, ECF Nos. 160, 174-177. Subsequently, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs utilized GAI and cited non-existent or erroneous authorities in their recent court submissions. Puerto Rico Soccer League, No. 23-cv-01203 (Mar. 19, 2025), ECF No. 187. Upon conducting an independent review, the court found that four of the plaintiffs' motions contained multiple incorrect citations referencing cases that could not be located and presumably do not exist. Id. The court acknowledged that the use of GAI was not prohibited; however, attorneys have a duty to demonstrate competence to their clients and a duty of candor to the tribunal. Id. Consequently, the court ordered the plaintiffs to file a memorandum explaining why sanctions should not be imposed on them for violations of Rule 11 and professional conduct standards. Id. In response, the plaintiffs proclaimed that AI was not used in drafting the filings at issue; rather, the various errors occurred due to "human oversight under significant time constraints." Puerto Rico Soccer League, No. 23-cv-01203, slip op. at 3 (Apr. 10, 2025), ECF No. 206 (internal quotations omitted). The court found the plaintiffs struck "a defiant and deflective tone" in their response, and was not persuaded by their arguments to avoid sanctions. Id. at 6, 9. According to the court, "[w]hether generative artificial intelligence was used or not is immaterial, what matters is that the Plaintiffs provided the Court with a litany of inaccurate information in support of their claims." Id. at 7. In its opinion and order, the court meticulously scrutinized the 55 erroneous citations contained in the plaintiffs' filings. Id. at 11-37. in considering sanctions, the court reflected that an award of attorney's fees would be appropriate, in part, given the "time and energy required by Defendants and the Court to fact-check Plaintiffs' filings." Id. at 5, 8. Accordingly, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' fees incurred related to the filings at issue. Id. at 10. The court granted the defendants 21 days to submit an itemized attorney's fee application. Id. Pursuant to the court's order, the defendants submitted an application for attorney fees. FIFA’s Application For Attorneys’ Fees, Puerto Rico Soccer League, No. 23-cv-01203 (May 5, 2025), ECF No. 235. The amount of attorney time and dollar amounts were redacted in the defendants' application. Id. at 1-2, 4, 6, 8-9, 12-13. However, a formatting error in the application revealed that the defendants sought more than $50,000 for time spent in responding to the plaintiffs' AI-hallucination-riddled filings. The court ordered the defendants to respond to the plaintiff's attorney fee application by June 18, 2025. Puerto Rico Soccer League, No. 23-cv-01203 (May 7, 2025), ECF No. 239. See also Madison Arnold, FIFA Seeks Fees After Citation Mistakes In Antitrust Case, Law360 (May 2, 2025). Docket. |